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Whither the National Labor Relations Board? 
Go to the NLRB’s website and you’ll find only two faces and two names: 
• Wilma B, Liebman, Chairman, and 
• Peter Carey Schaumber, now in his second term. 
[http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/overview/board/index.aspx] 
The page also lists three vacancies. Why? “The National Labor Relations Board 
has operated with only two members for more than two years because Democrats refused 
to confirm President George W. Bush’s nominees because of complaints that they were 
pro-business. Republicans now are blocking President Obama’s nominees, complaining 
that some favor union interests.” [Jesse J. Holland, “Supreme Court looks at labor board,” 
Boston Globe, March 24, 2010.] The stalemate has created a potential crisis of major 
proportions.  
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On March 23rd, the Supreme Court heard arguments in a case challenging the 
validity of a two-member NLRB to render binding decisions. A fully-staffed board 
delegated its powers to the two hold-overs when it became clear that members would be 
rotating off without any hope of replacements. The two-member “rump” board has 
rendered nearly 600 decisions to date. “Decisions in hundreds of worker-employer battles 
could be thrown out if the Supreme Court rules against the NLRB. That decision could 
also force the shutdown of the board.” [Id.] 
Opponents say all the decisions the two board members have made are illegal. 
“One of the things that we think is clear is that the remedy for fixing an undersized board 
is not for the board to redefine itself . . . but for Congress or the president to act,’’ said 
lawyer Sheldon E. Richie, who represented New Process Steel L.P., which lost an unfair 
labor practices case in front of the short-staffed NLRB. 
But government lawyers said the full board legally voted to give all of its power 
to the two members, and the decisions made since then are legal. Wilma Liebman, NLRB 
chairman, a Democrat, and fellow board member Peter Schaumber, a Republican, have 
issued 586 decisions to date as a two-member board. “I am not here suggesting that the 
two-member board is ideal or equivalent or optimal," Deputy Solicitor General Neal 
Katyal said. “But faced with a vacancy crisis and shutting down the board entirely, I 
think the board did the prudent thing here by continuing to operate, continuing for these 
800 or so days to decide these cases.’’[Id.] 
When the Supreme Court renders its decision later this year, it will resolve a 
conflict that has arisen among three U.S. Courts of Appeals in just the few short years 
that the board has been operating without its full complement. Opinions issued 
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simultaneously on May 1, 2009, by the Seventh and D.C. Circuits represent the differing 
interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act on this point: 
 
• New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir., May 1, 2009): 
New Process’ first objection to the NLRB’s orders is that it lacks authority to 
issue them in the first place. A little background information is needed for this argument. 
The NLRB, by statute, consists of five members. Those members are appointed by the 
President with the advice and consent of the Senate and serve staggered five year terms. 
29 U.S.C. § 153(a). Also by statute, the NLRB is allowed to delegate the authority of the 
five member body to smaller, three member panels. This delegation process was spelled 
in § 3(b) of the NLRA: 
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any or 
all of the powers which it may itself exercise … A vacancy in the Board shall not 
impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the 
Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of 
the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group 
designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b). 
On December 28, 2007, with one seat already vacant and another member’s term 
about to expire, the four members of the Board delegated all of its authority to a three 
member panel. When the recess appointment of one member of that group of three 
expired three days later, the remaining two members proceeded as a quorum. As of 
January 2009, the NLRB had issued over 300 opinions, both published and unpublished, 
through this two-member quorum. New Process alleges that this delegation procedure 
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violates both the plain meaning of § 3(b) of the NLRA and the purpose of that act as 
embodied in the relevant legislative history because it was in fact a delegation to a two-
member panel rather than a three-member panel. 
We begin with the plain meaning of the statute. New Process claims that the 
Board’s delegation was improper in the first instance. The third member, whose term was 
about to expire, was in New Process’ view a phantom member who would not actually 
consider the cases before the Board. New Process claims that this procedure violated the 
plain meaning of the first sentence of the act because it is not a delegation to “three or 
more” members of the NLRB, but only to two members. The upshot of New Process’ 
view, as their counsel explained at oral argument, is that the first sentence of § 3(b) 
restricts the Board from acting when its membership falls below three. 
The NLRB argues that the statute at issue is clear that the vacancy of one member 
of a three member panel does not impede the right of the remaining two members to 
execute the full delegated powers of the NLRB. As the NLRB delegated its full powers to 
a group of three Board members, the two remaining Board members can proceed as a 
quorum despite the subsequent vacancy. This indeed is the plain meaning of the text. As 
we read it, § 3(b) accomplished two things: first, it gave the Board the power to delegate 
its authority to a group of three members, and second, it allowed the Board to continue to 
conduct business with a quorum of three members but expressly provides that two 
members of the Board constitutes a quorum where the Board has delegated its' *846 
authority to a group of three members. The plain meaning of the statute thus supports the 
NLRB’s delegation procedure. 
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• Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir., 
May 1, 2009): 
Indeed, if Congress intended a two-member Board to be able to act as if it had a 
quorum, the existing statutory language would be an unlikely way to express that 
intention. The quorum provision clearly requires that a quorum of the Board is, “at all 
times,” three members. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b). A modifying phrase as unambiguous as this 
denotes that there is no instance in which this Board quorum requirement may be 
disregarded. Contrary to the Board’s contentions, Congress did not intend to use the 
delegee group quorum provision as an exception to the requirement that the Board 
quorum requirement must be met “at all times.” Though the delegee group quorum 
provision is preceded by the prepositional phrase “except that,” id., Congress’s use of 
differing object nouns within the two quorum provisions indicates clearly that each 
quorum provision is independent from the other. The establishment of a two-member 
quorum of a subordinate group does not logically require any change in the provision 
mandating a three-member quorum for the Board as a whole. In fact, it does not seem odd 
at all that a sub-unit of any body would have a smaller quorum number than the quorum 
of the body as a whole. Quorums, after all, are usually majorities. A majority of three is 
smaller than a majority of five. It therefore defies logic as well as the text of the statute to 
argue, as the Board does, that a Congress which explicitly imposed a requirement for a 
three-member quorum “at all times” would in the same sentence allow the Board to 
reduce its operative quorum to two without further congressional authorization. Congress 
provided unequivocally that a quorum of the Board is three members, and that this 
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requirement must be met at all times. The delegee group quorum provision does not 
eliminate this requirement. 
 
New Board members take office. In early April, Board Members Craig Becker 
and Mark Gaston Pearce took office and began a series of orientation programs about the 
Board, its organizational procedures and case inventory. Becker was sworn into office on 
April 5th by General Counsel Ronald Meisburg. Pearce was sworn in three days later by 
Chairman Wilma Liebman. 
The seating of Becker and Pearce brings the Board to four members with one 
remaining vacancy. While this breaking of the deadlock is good news for some parties 
with pending cases, it doesn’t resolve the fate of the 595 cases decided by the rump 
Board. Their fate remains in the hands of the nation’s highest Court, which currently is 
the only branch of the federal government controlled by conservatives. 
 
Supreme Court Knocks Down Barriers to Corporate, Labor Spending in Political 
Campaigns.  
As labor and business eagerly await the high court’s ruling on whether the 
approximately 600 decisions rendered by just two NLRB members are valid or not [see 
5.2, above], both sides of the table also are evaluating the reconfigured battlefield 
resulting from the Supremes’ ruling that the First Amendment allows for unlimited 
spending in election contests. [Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.Ct. 
876 (January 21, 2010).] 
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Facts. Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation. It initiated its action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A three-judge court later 
convened to hear the case. The resulting judgment gave rise to a rare direct appeal to the 
Supreme Court. 
According to the Court, Citizens United has an annual budget of about $12 
million. Most of its funds are from donations by individuals, but, in addition, it accepts a 
“small portion” of its funds from for-profit corporations. In January 2008, Citizens 
United released a film entitled Hillary: The Movie. It’s a 90-minute documentary about 
then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was a candidate in the Democratic Party’s 2008 
Presidential primary elections. Hillary mentioned Senator (now Secretary of State) 
Clinton by name and depicted interviews with political commentators and other persons, 
most of them quite critical of Clinton. Hillary was released in theaters and on DVD, but 
Citizens United wanted to increase distribution by making it available through video-on-
demand. 
Video-on-demand allows digital cable subscribers to select programming from 
various menus, including movies, television shows, sports, news, and music. The viewer 
can watch the program at any time and can elect to rewind or pause the program. In 
December 2007, a cable company offered, for a payment of $1.2 million, to make Hillary 
available on a video-on-demand channel called “Elections ’08.” Some video-on-demand 
services require viewers to pay a small fee to view a selected program, but here the 
proposal was to make Hillary available to viewers free of charge. 
To implement the proposal, Citizens United was prepared to pay for the video-on-
demand. To promote the film, it produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad for 
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Hillary. Each ad included a short statement about Clinton, followed by the name of the 
movie and the movie’s Website address. Citizens United desired to promote the video-
on-demand offering by running advertisements on broadcast and cable television. 
Citizens United sought a declaratory judgment. Before the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), federal law already prohibited corporations and unions 
from using general treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates and 
independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, 
through any form of media, in connection with certain “qualified” federal elections. [2 
U.S.C. § 441b (2000 ed.); see McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 
(2003).] The BCRA § 203 amended § 441b to prohibit any “electioneering 
communication” as well. [2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006 ed.).] An electioneering 
communication is defined by the act as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is 
made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election. [§ 434(f)(3)(A).] 
The Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) regulations further defined an 
electioneering communication as a communication that is “publicly distributed.” [11 CFR 
§ 100.29(a)(2) (2009).] “In the case of a candidate for nomination for President … 
publicly distributed means” that the communication “[c]an be received by 50,000 or more 
persons in a State where a primary election … is being held within 30 days.” [§ 
100.29(b)(3)(ii).]  
Corporations and unions were barred from using their general treasury funds for 
express advocacy or electioneering communications. They might establish, however, a 
“separate segregated fund” (known as a political action committee, or PAC) for these 
8
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 5 [2010], Art. 2
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss5/2
purposes. [ 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).] The money received by the segregated fund were 
limited to donations from stockholders and employees of the corporation or, in the case 
of unions, members of the union. 
As noted above, Citizens United wanted to make Hillary available through video-
on-demand within 30 days of the 2008 primary elections. It feared, however, that both the 
film and the ads would be covered by § 441b’s ban on corporate-funded independent 
expenditures, thus subjecting it to civil and criminal penalties under § 437g. In December 
2007, Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the FEC. It argued 
that (1) § 441b was unconstitutional as applied to Hillary; and (2) the BCRA’s disclaimer 
and disclosure requirements [BCRA §§ 201 and 311] were unconstitutional as applied to 
Hillary and to the three ads for the movie. 
The District Court denied Citizens United’s motion for a preliminary injunction 
[530 F.Supp.2d 274 (D.D.C.2008) (per curiam)], and then granted the FEC’s motion for 
summary judgment. The court held that § 441b was facially constitutional under 
McConnell, and that § 441b was constitutional as applied to Hillary because it was 
“susceptible of no other interpretation than to inform the electorate that Senator Clinton is 
unfit for office, that the United States would be a dangerous place in a President Hillary 
Clinton world, and that viewers should vote against her.” The court also rejected Citizens 
United’s challenge to the BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure requirements. It noted that 
“the Supreme Court has written approvingly of disclosure provisions triggered by 
political speech even though the speech itself was constitutionally protected under the 
First Amendment.” 
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The conservative majority reverses. Led by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the 5-
Justice conservative majority currently holding sway in the Supreme Court reversed the 
district judges’ decision. The bare majority held, “Federal statute barring corporations 
from using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures that expressly 
advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in connection 
with certain qualified federal elections, and, as amended by Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 (BCRA), barring corporations from using general treasury funds to make 
independent expenditures for electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary 
election or 60 days of general election for federal office, violated First Amendment 
political speech rights of nonprofit corporation that wished to distribute on cable 
television, through video-on-demand, a film regarding a candidate seeking nomination as 
a political party’s candidate in the next Presidential election.” In so holding, the majority 
expressly overruled McConnell, though the decision was only seven years old. 
Bitter dissent. That the Chief Justice and several of the other Justices in the 
majority penned concurring opinions suggests how controversial the Court’s majority 
decision is. Additionally, the Court’s four moderate-to-liberal members issued a dissent 
that is nearly equal in length to the majority and concurring opinions taken together. 
Authored by Justice Stevens, the dissent begins, “The real issue in this case concerns 
how, not if, the appellant may finance its electioneering. Citizens United is a wealthy 
nonprofit corporation that runs a political action committee (PAC) with millions of 
dollars in assets. Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), it could 
have used those assets to televise and promote Hillary: The Movie wherever and 
whenever it wanted to. It also could have spent unrestricted sums to broadcast Hillary at 
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any time other than the 30 days before the last primary election. Neither Citizens 
United’s nor any other corporation’s speech has been “banned,” ante, at 886. All that the 
parties dispute is whether Citizens United had a right to use the funds in its general 
treasury to pay for broadcasts during the 30-day period. The notion that the First 
Amendment dictates an affirmative answer to that question is, in my judgment, 
profoundly misguided. Even more misguided is the notion that the Court must rewrite the 
law relating to campaign expenditures by for-profit corporations and unions to decide this 
case.” 
Justice Stevens and his colleagues contend, “The basic premise underlying the 
Court’s ruling is its iteration, and constant reiteration, of the proposition that the First 
Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker’s identity, including its 
“identity” as a corporation. While that glittering generality has rhetorical appeal, it is not 
a correct statement of the law. Nor does it tell us when a corporation may engage in 
electioneering that some of its shareholders oppose. It does not even resolve the specific 
question whether Citizens United may be required to finance some of its messages with 
the money in its PAC. The conceit that corporations must be treated identically to natural 
persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the 
Court’s disposition of this case. 
“In the context of election to public office, the distinction between corporate and 
human speakers is significant. Although they make enormous contributions to our 
society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. 
Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may 
conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. The financial 
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resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corporations raise legitimate 
concerns about their role in the electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling 
constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard 
against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national 
races.” 
 
Organized labor’s reaction. Since the Court’s decision frees up labor unions, as 
well as for- and not-for-profit corporations to wade into the potential spending spree, one 
might expect organized labor to applaud the conservative majority’s decision. If AFL-
CIO President Richard Trumka’s reaction is typical, then quite the contrary is true. In a 
statement issued on the day the decision was announced, Trumka complained: 
Today, the Supreme Court further tilted the playing field in favor of 
business corporations in public elections. By allowing unlimited corporate 
treasury expenditures that explicitly support or oppose particular candidates, the 
Court has increased the already excessive influence that corporations exert in our 
electoral system. And we believe the Court wrongly treated corporate 
expenditures the same as union expenditures, contrary to the arguments we made 
in our brief in this case. Unions, unlike businesses, are democratically-controlled, 
nonprofit membership organizations representing working men and women across 
the country, and their independent speech should accordingly be given greater 
protection. 
The AFL-CIO supports a system of campaign finance regulation that 
promotes democratic participation in elections by individuals and their 
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associations; protects legitimate independent speech rights; offers public 
financing to candidates while firmly regulating contributions to them; and 
guarantees effective disclosure of who is paying for what. 
[http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/pr01212010a.cfm] 
 
Authors’ comments.  
Labor relations in the private sector of the U.S. economy are in a state of turmoil. 
As pointed out in section 5.2, above, the Supreme Court may very well rule later this year 
that some 600 decisions, rendered by a two-member “rump” regime of the National 
Labor Relations Board, are invalid and must be vacated. Given the willingness of the five 
conservatives on the high court — Roberts, Alito, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas — to toss 
out a precedent dating back only to 2003 in order to allow unlimited corporate spending 
on electioneering, we shouldn’t expect concern for judicial stability to prevent their 
invalidation of 600 labor board decisions, as well. 
Although the stalemate in Congress over the approval of new Board members 
broke in April with the appointment of two new Members (see 5.2, above), the only real 
solution may be significant reform of the federal labor law scheme. Successive 
administrations and Congresses have avoided biting this bullet since the National Labor 
Relations Act was last amended in a significant way, more than half a century ago. The 
reason for this inaction seems to be that Democrats and Republicans, and labor and 
management, fear what might emerge if the entire statutory structure were opened for 
debate. 
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However, the Obama administration — finally having a healthcare act on its 
trophy wall— just might be willing to move labor law to one of its front burners during 
the window of opportunity that will most likely close in November 2010, when the 
Democrats could lose control of the House of Representatives. Whether Obama and 
company see labor as an urgent issue and whether they have the stomach for yet another 
big battle are questions that remain to be answered during the next six months.  
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